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Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative Advantage:
Designing a System of Emergency Protection
I. Introduction
Recently, many governments in industrialized countries have
increasingly used various instruments of "contingent" or
"administered" protection. As indicated by the words contingent
and administered, under these procedures import-competing firms
can be provided with protection only if they satisfy a number of
necessary conditions. The most frequently encountered examples
of these procedures are antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty
(CVD) measures, and safeguard or emergency protection laws that
implement Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) .- In contrast to other avenues through which firms
can attempt to obtain relief from import competition, contingent
measures are usually embodied in legislation which spells out the
criteria that need to be satisfied, as well as the procedures to
be followed. Alternatives to contingent protection include
direct lobbying by firms for protection and industry-to-industry
arrangements such as voluntary export restraints (VERs).
In practice all these instruments are (imperfect)
substitutes for each other, as to a large extent they all address
the same issue: protection of domestic firms from competitive
pressures caused by shifts in comparative advantage. 2  While
these shifts are an inherent and fundamental element of the
Safeguards or emergency protection as mandated by Article
XIX of the GATT is supposed to be temporary and non-
discriminatory. The designers of the GATT intended that
safeguard actions were to be the primary avenue to deal with
market disruption arising from "fair" trade. AD/CVD, in
contrast, formally are instruments to address the "unfair"
practice of dumping and subsidization, respectively. Dumping is
defined as charging an export price for a product that is less
than what is charged for the same product in the firm's home
market. In this paper we will abstract from the fair - unfair
distinction, as it is irrelevant to our argument. In what
follows, the terms contingent and administered protection will
be used interchangeably.
2 More often than not, the source of the problem lies in a
comparative disadvantage. An example is mismanagement of
domestic import-competing firms or macro.economic policy.
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market process, in the practical trade policy setting the focus
tends to be on increases in import penetration, and not so much
the reasons underlying them. One of our goals in this paper is
to provide some guidance to policymakers wishing to rationalize
or create a system to deal with "market disruption caused by
imports." 3  In particular, many (developing) nations may be
contemplating the creation of such a system, especially in the
context of unilateral liberalization programmes (Nesserlin,
1988). It appears that this sometimes implies that existing
legislation in developed market economies is copied. We find
this to be deplorable, as most instruments that exist currently
are often both ineffective and very costly. While improvements
in industrialized nations are usually hindered by the difficulty
of revoking a law once it has been ennacted, many (developing)
countries are still in the position of starting "de novo." They
should thus in principle be able to implement a rational system
of emergency protection.'
In this paper we take the need for a system to protect
domestic producers from "disruptive" import competition as given.
Why this need exists is a very important and interesting
question, but it will not be addressed here.5 Instead, we focus
on three criteria that a system of emergency protection should
satisfy: (1) effectiveness (i.e., work as intended); (2)
efficiency (i.e., be least costly for all parties concerned); and
* Other recent contributions that focus on this issue
include Hoekman (1989), Richardson (1988), and Sampson (1987).
'Of course, many developing countries maintain an extensive
pattern of protection. We do not consider the problem of
converting existing measures of protection to conform with the
system of emergency protection. To the extent that permnent.fl
protection is desired the latter is unlikely to be relevant, even
though it will be in a country's interest to convert quotas and
import licenses to tariffs. See Anderson (1988) on the general
superiority of tariffs over quotas.
* Of the rationales that have been suggested in the
literature, we can mention two. The first is that a system is
required to allow liberalization to occur in the first place.
The second postulates that governments (electorates) refuse to
accept changes in real income (or proxies such as employment)
that are "too" large or abrupt (Corden, 1974).
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(3) fairness (i.e. distribute the cost of intervention across
affected parties in an equitable manner). In terms of designing
a system of emergency protection, policymakers need to determine
the remedy (the instrument to be used in intervening) and the
rules under which intervention will be allowed. Section II of
this paper focuses on the choice of remedy, while Sections III
and IV focus on the effects of various rules. We illustrate the
importance of alternative rules by analyzing various ways in
which current measures of administered protection work.' In
doing this a number of shortcomings embodied in current
procedures will come to light. For example, it is demonstrated
that the threat effect of a procedure often may have unintended
consequences, and that both threats and the criteria which have
to be satisfied for protection to be granted can easily distort
production decisions of firms. Concluding remarks are in Section
V.
II. Choice of Instrument of Protection
Various possibilities regarding the instrument of
intervention are noted in Table 1. They include: (1) selective
protection with (implicit) compensation for affected exporters;
(2) selective protection without compensation; (3)
nondiscriminatory protection without compensation; (4)
nondiscriminatory protection with (implicit) compensation; (5)
export taxes; and (6) subsidization of import-competing
industries; and (7) subsidization of specific factors of
production.
[insert Table 1)
To be efficient and equitable, any instrument of emergency
protection needs to be effective, minimize distortions, and allow
for the compensation of exporters. To be effective, intervention
should be nondiscriminatory. Existing measures of contingent
6 We have chosen to minimize complexity as far as formal
modeling is concerned. Thus, while the theoretical arguments
developed in the subsections can be made with greater generality,
this would not add additional insights.
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protection such as AD and CVD are discriminatory in nature, as
are VERs. Thus, they can only be of limited effectiveness. This
is because of the scope that exists for trade diversion, and
circumvention via third-country exports. Because selective
protection is porous it is likely to lead to gradual expansion
of coverage. Arguments along the lines that porous protection
is better in terms of welfare for the imposing nation are rather
facile, as porous protection often will imply a continued
pressure for (additional) protection. Experience has shown that
in practice measures of discriminatory protection tend to be
expanded over time to cover all suppliers.' This is a highly
inefficient procedure, as it locks in an arbitrary pattern of
production and trade. Moreover, this pattern is one which is
greatly distorted due to the piecemeal invocation of successive
discriminatory measures. Even to the extent that transhipment
or diversion occurs, consumers will still end up paying higher
prices than if protection is nondiscriminatory. Mpre
importantly, selective actions not only create vested interests
at home, but also abroad, as less competitive exporters seek to
maintain the status quo. Discriminatory measures facilitate
noncompetitive practices such as market sharing and (implicit)
price collusion." The result is that the costs of selective
measures will almost always outweigh benefits.
Minimization of distortions requires, inter alia, that the
instrument be invoked for a limited period of time (be temporary)
and that affected exporters be compensated.' As intervention is
intended only to give domestic producers a "breathing" space, it
is clear that support should be limited in time. Degressivity
will gradually subject import-competing firms to increased
foreign competition, and thus avoid potential shocks associated
' See for example Baldwin (1982) and UNCTAD (1984). The
prime examples of this are, of course, textiles and steel.
*See Bergsten (1975), Jones (1984), and Murray, Schmidt,
and Walter (1978) on quotas and VERs, and Messerlin (1988) and
Finger and Olechowski (1987) on AD/CVD.
' Equivalently and preferably, the level of support can be
gradually reduced during this period (be degressive).
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with an abrupt end of the support. While the limited duration
requirement is uncontroversial, this is not the case for
compensation of affected exporters.
Indeed, arguments against compensation are frequently made
in the literature. 10 They are largely pragmatic, in that they
revolve around the fact that usually firms have alternative ways
to attempt to obtain protection (direct lobbying, VERs,
administered protection). As compensation makes protection more
costly (and thus less attractive), so the argument goes,
requiring it will increase the incentive to use AD/CVD and/or to
negotiate VERs. While this is true, removing a compensation
requirement is a n*-best solution that will not necessarily
improve on the status quo. There are both efficiency, equity,
and pragmatic arguments for compensation. Furthermore, as will
be discussed presently, this is quite feasible to implement.
One pragmatic argument for compensation is that it obviates
the need for retaliation. From the point of view of developing
countries or small open economies an offer of compensation should
ensure that no retaliation will result after they invoke
emergency protection. Retaliation is usually very costly to all
parties concerned. Given that it has been decided that the
import-competing industry should be supported, sharing any
resulting rents with affected exporters is a rational strategy
in the context of the threat of retaliation." Another pragmatic
argument that compensation raises the costs of intervention to
the importing nation and thus should reduce the incentives to
pursue it.
1* See, for example, Jackson (1986), Hufbauer and Rosen
(1986) , Hufbauer and Schott (1985). Arguments against
compensation are not new. Thus, the basic argument can be found
in Tumlir (1974).
"' This is a general argument that applies to large as well
as to small economies. Of course, getting large trading powers
such as the EC or the U.S. to offer compensation to smaller
nations in the context of emergency protection is another issue
altogether, as the "large" only have to worry about retaliation
amongst themselves. There is an important negotiation problem
here which we will not address in this paper. See Hoekman
(1989).
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Turning to narrower arguments based on economic theory, the
following efficiency-based argument for compensation can be made,
drawing on the property-rights literature. When nations impose
protection they are creating a negative externality for affected
exporters. Conversely, exporters presumably were imposing
negative externalities on domestic import-competing firms by
injuring them. As in the literature on externalities and
property rights, the question can be asked what the optimal
distribution of rights is. According to Coase (1960), the party
with the higher marginal transaction costs should get the rights.
Alternatively, the party with the lower transaction costs can be
assigned liability. Examples of transactions costs include costs
of detection, monitoring, communication, and negotiation. All
of these costs are likely to be higher for exporters. The
implication is that importers need to compensate exporters when
imposing the "protection externality" if an efficient outcome is
to result."
The best known economic case for compensation is probably
due to Bhagwati (1976) .1 The argument is that there exists both
an efficiency and an equity case for compensation because
exporters suffer a double reduction in welfare due to the threat
of protection and the eventual imposition of protection. This
reduction in welfare is caused by the need to shift production
factors from tradables to nontradables and to alter the
consumption mix in comparison to a world where the threat does
not exist and protection is never imposed. The effects of
12 Efficiency in a Coasian bargaining framework is only
ensured in an ideal world without transaction costs or strategic
behavior and where players have complete information. In the
absence of these conditions, efficiency requires that rights be
allocated via competitive bid, not by preassignment (Samuelson,
1985). This, however, is not possible in practice in
international relations, so that the second-best solution is to
use the liability rule as advocated by Coase. Note,
incidentally, that in the GATT context multilateral negotiations
and the possibility of renegotiating the balance of rights and
concessions can be interpreted as an approximation to the
required reauctioning of property rights.
"3Which is based on the analysis in Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1976).
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imposition of protection on a small economy are well known, of
course, and are illustrated in Figure 2. If no possibility of
protection exists, and assuming the absence of both distortions
and uncertainty, one gets the standard case of the country
producing on its transformation curve (P,) and consuming
somewhere along the terms-of-trade line (C.). If protection is
imposed by the importing country, the exporter faces a new
terms-of-trade line, and ends up producing at P3 and consuming at
C,. Welfare has diminished and production has shifted towards
the importable good (Q2) -" To the extent that compensation can
prevent or reduce the cost of this shift in resources there
exists an efficiency rationale for compensation.
Current procedures do not score very high in terms of
effectiveness, degressivity, and compensation. As AD/CVD and
VERs are discriminatory, their imposition can only be effective
during the short run, while nondiscriminatory protection as
mandated by Article XIX of GATT should be effective, of course.
While compensation under Article XIX (safeguards) procedures is
required by GATT rules, it is rarely offered." VERs will imply
compensation to the extent that exporters can capture (part of)
the quota rents, while AD/CVD usually imply no compensation. 1"
VERs/AD/CVD are not subject to specific time limits, nor are they
degressive, while for safeguard actions under Article XIX these
Assuming a 2-period world and that welfare in the absence
of a quota remains constant, the loss to the exporting country
due to the existence of the threat is equal to the discounted
expected value of the difference between utility in periods one
and two, or rq(U1-U 2 )>0, where U2 is the utility in period 2 if
the quota is invoked (U3<U 2 ) , r is the discount -factor, and q is
the probability of the quota being imposed (O<q<l) . See Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (1976).
"See Sampson (1987) . Article XIX does not mention
compensation, but allows (after failed consultations and
agreement of GATT members) affected parties to withdraw
equivalent "concessions" 1 (that is, to retaliate). In practice,
compensation has evolved as a way to avoid retaliation. See
Jackson (1986) for more on this topic.
"EThe only potential exception being if an undertaking by
the exporter is accepted to reduce exports or raise prices in
lieu of the imposition of a duty.
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requirements may or may not be met in practice (Sampson, 1987).
The problem is then to choose a remedy that applies
nondiscriminately and allows exporters to be compensated.
Possibilities include subsidization of either import-competing
industries or factors of production, export taxes, and border
measures such as tariffs and quotas. Those who propose subsidies
as a remedy argue that in contrast to border measures they allow
the source of the underlying adjustment problem to be targetted."
Border protection may foster adjustment, but not in an efficient
manner, given that it distorts consumer choices to no good
effect. In the same vein, proposals have been made to use both
subsidies and tariffs or auctioned quotas, using the income
generated by the latter to finance adjustment programs (the
subsidy) ."
While subsidies in theory are more efficient than border
protection, this argument should not be taken too far, as
governments need to be able to analyze the current situation and
target the subsidy correctly. This is usually extremely
difficult. Furthermore, there exist multilateral constraints on
the feasibility of subsidizing domestic industries, so that their
use requires multilateral agreement. Subsidization is costly
in the sense that it requires direct expenditures. Although this
can be beneficial in terms of increasing the visibility of
protection, it may also make intervention too costly. This
perception motivates proposals to levy a tariff or auction quotas
and use the revenue to subsidize the industry. But, this type
of politically convenient "self-financing" will create great
incentives for revenue-seeking and is likely to increase
pressures for protection. It is also not equitable, as no
justification is offered for taxing both foreign producers and
domestic consumers of the product involved. The lack of
"A number of proposals have been made in the ongoing
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to use subsidies
as the remedy in emergency protection (Hoekinan, 1989).
" The Institute for International Economics has been a
prominent example. See Bergsten et al. (1987), Hufbauer and
Rosen (1986), and Hufbauer et al. (1986).
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compensation of affected exporters is a general problem with
trade-fiananced subsidization.
The attractiveness of subsidization depends also on the goal
underlying the intervention. To the extent that there are
distortions that inhibit adjustment to structural changes, a
targetted tax-cum-subsidy .approach will be much more efficient
than intervention in trade. But, if the intention is to reduce
imports per , a border measure will be the optimal instrument."
We believe that emergency protection should focus only on
reducing imports, because the existence of "adjustment
distortions" has nothing to do with increased import penetration.
In a market economy changes in technology and tastes inherently
require adjustment of domestic producers. Policies to deal with
adjustment problems, if any, should be available to tLL domestic
producers (factors of production), not just those that happen to
be subject to import competition. Thus, a general policy is
called for, not a trade policy.
An alternative instrument that in principle allows both
compensation and nondiscrimination is the imposition of export
taxes by the governments of the exporting firms. In this
connection, Anderson (1988) speaks of voluntary export taxes
(VETs). We are dubious about the practicality of such an
instrument in the context of emergency protection. There are
likely to be severe negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement
problems involved with this option. The fact that the measure
is not under the direct control of the government of the
importing nation severely limits the feasibility of VETs.
In practice, we believe temporary (i.e. degressive)
nondiscriminatory border protection is likely to be the
preferable instrument to impose, especially if the objective is
to cut back imports. Thus, the choice is between tariffs and
quotas. While tariffs are more efficient than quotas, the
problem with a tariff is that it will be difficult to compensate
19 See Johnson (1965) or Bhagwati and.Srinivasan (1969).
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affected exporters." This is not the case for quotas. If all
affected exporters are allocated a quota and these quotas are
tradable the result will be equivalent to a MFN tariff. This is
because tradability implies that more efficient producers will
buy up quotas from less efficient producers so that in
equilibrium there will be a single quota premium. Tradability
ensures that all exporters are compensated, but that the pattern
of trade and production will still follow comparative advantage."
Thus, while tariffs would be preferable, compensation problems
make the use of quotas more attractive in cases of teporary
emergency protection.
Degressivity can be achieved via a gradual expansion of the
global quota, in such a fashion that its growth exceeds the
growth in world demand. The result will be a gradual reduction
in the quota premium. Note that under this system inefficient
suppliers will continue to be compensated. -An alternative to a
global quota is to use a tariff quota. Here degressivity can be
achieved via a gradual reduction of the out-of-quota tariff rate.
The difference between this and tradable country quotas is that
as the out-of-quota tariff becomes low enough, the most efficient
producers will just pay the tariff and not bid for the quotas of
the less efficient producers. As long as the tariff is not too
high (falls fast enough) a tariff quota may imply lower costs for
the importing nation (less rents for the least efficient
producers). While the importing country will eventually end up
generating some tariff revenue, initially all affected exporters
20 Thus, reducing tariffs on other sectors is likely to lead
to strong opposition domestically, while redistribution of tariff
revenue to foreigners is rather unlikely to be possible
politically. Even if it were possible, it would most likely
accrue to the foreign government, not to the affected firms.
To our knowledge, the idea to use a global tradable quota
as a remedy in a safeguards context was first proposed by
Deardorff (1987). Tradability ensures that the worst distortion
induced by quotas (short-circuiting of the efficiency properties
of arbitrage through the price mechanism) will be minimized. We
recognize that quotas are inherently more distortionary than
tariffs (Anderson, 1988), but feel that their compensation
properties, in conjunction with the fact that they are tradable
and temporary, outweighs any efficiency costs.
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will have been compensated. Under either procedure the most
efficient producers will continue to export as long as quotas are
tradable. We prefer the global quota system, in large part
because it is simpler."
III. Access Subject to Preconditions
That firms affected by import-competition should have access
to the system of emergency protection appears to be an obvious
requirement. That there need to be preconditions that the firm
must satisfy is also intuitive: there is a need to limit the
incentives for rent-seeking behavior. However, if preconditions
are too difficult to satisfy, in practice firms may not have
access to the system, and thus will have an incentive to lobby
directly for protection and/or to collude with their overseas
competitors. For example, a strong case can be made that
presently emergency (safeguard) protection that conforms to GATT
rules (Article XIX) is rarely invoked because in many nations
access to this instrument is difficult, uncertain, or
nonexistent.2 3 Usually, it is more attractive for firms to use
alternative instruments such as AD/CVD, negotiate VERs, or lobby
policymakers directly for protection.
In practice all existing contingent instruments require
preconditions to be satisfied before protection is granted. The
most frequent criterion is a need for firms to demonstrate the
occurence of injury caused by import competition. If such a
constraint did not exist the incentives for rent-seeking behavior
would be enormous. An additional requirement that may be imposed
in legislation implementing Article XIX is that support be in the
national interest. While such requirements do not usually exist
for AD and CVD,"' dumping and subsidization need to be
22 For a detailed discussion of the tariff-quota possibility,
see Sampson and Takacs (1988).
"See, for example, Hufbauer et al. (1986) .
2' The exception being EC antidumping legislation. However,
this does not appear to be much of a constraint in practice. See
Messerlin (1988).
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demonstrated, respectively, of course.
The problem with criteria is that they may easily create
incentives for import-competing firms to try and satisfy them,
or for exporting firms to ensure that they are not met. In
general, potential problems arise if the expected returns of
protection exceed the opportunity costs of feig0ing that criteria
are met. In terms of establishing criteria for an instrument of
emergency protection, the goal should be to minimze the scope for
such behavior. Thus, the problem is not only that rules are
required to restrict rent-seeking via "direct" lobbying, but that
careful attention be given to the design of these rules in order
to minimize the possible manipulation by firms.
Feigning that criteria (rules) have been met is in itself
an intervention- (rent-) seeking activity, and it can be likened
to "indirect" as opposed to "direct" lobbying. The latter has
been analyzed extensively in the literature on rent-seeking and
directly unproductive profit seeking (DUP). A distinguishing
charateristic of these activities are that they imply the use of
real resources. As shall be explained below, this is not
necessarily the case when firms attempt to satisfy the criteria
of contingent measures of protection, i.e. engage in indirect
lobbying.
Indirect lobbying belongs to the class of policy-imposed
distortions," and the potential scope for such activity increases
as there exist more criteria. It is likely to occur especially
when satisfaction of well-defined criteria are a precondition for
protection. While one might argue that as the ambiguity in the
precise definition of the criteria increases, so do the
incentives to appear injured, this is not necessarily the case.
More likely is a shift in intervention-seeking activity towards
direct lobbying activities, as the outcome of invoking
administered protection may then be too uncertain. The same
argument applies the more discretion the political authority
2" Bhagwati (1971) distinguishes autonomous from policy-
imposed distortions. The former include reasons for market
failure such as externalities, while the latter comprise man-
made distortions such as tariffs, quotas, and so forth.
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has. 2' The relative importance of indirect lobbying will be a
function of the strength and nature of the incentives embodied
in the criteria ad the extent to which these incentives can be
internalized by a firm. In general, producers can be expected
to adjust choice variables so as to conform as closely as
possible to criteria, while interfering as little as possible
with current and future profitability. The precise nature of the
firm's response will depend on the wording and implementation
(interpretation) of the criteria. 27
If there is scope for indirect lobbying, the prospect of
protection distorts firm behavior and thus leads to
inefficiencies. This can be demonstrated using the standard
small country 2-industry, 2-factor Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model. Assume the prospect of protection exists, so that there
is an opportunity cost for an industry associated with n
appearing to meet the required preconditions. Let this loss be
captured by a loss function, the argument(s) of which will depend
on the criteria that need to be satisfied. The problem facing
a representative producer of good 1 is then to maximize"
(1) p 1F(K,N) - L(-) - wN - rK,
where p1 F(-) is. the value of production, (pi being the world price
26 Under the U.S. escape clause (Section 201 of the 1974
Trade Act) the President remains free to reject a recommendation
for protection if he does not deem it in the national interest.
This has often occurred in practice. The effect of this
uncertainty is to increase the (perceived) need for direct
lobbying and increase the incentives to use alternative
instruments such as AD and VERs. While U.S. trade legislation
provides for a Congressional veto of the Presidents decision if
he diverges from the ITC's recommendation, this veto power has
never been used.
"Illustrations of possible indirect lobbying activities can
be found in Leidy and Hoekman (1989), on which this and the
following paragraphs are based.
" We assume throughout that only ( the import-competing )
industry 1 can petition for protection, so that the other
(industry 2) is free of indirect lobbying. We also assume away
all other possible distortions.
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of good 1 and F(-) being the production function), L(.) is the
loss function, and wN and rK represent the costs of labor and
capital inputs, respectively. Suppose that criteria focus on the
level of employment, so that L=L(N). The first order conditions
for this industry will be: p1F1(-)=r and p1F2(')=w + L' , (where
subscripts on F and the prime on L denote the relevant first
partial derivatives). The result is that production occurs below
the boundary of the production possiblity frontier (PPF), as
resources are allocated off the efficiency locus. As illustrated
in Figure 1, the PPF shrinks because an injury criterion based
on units of labor employed is akin to imposing a per unit tax on
labor in the import-competing industry equal to L'. Furthermore,
because the domestic rate of transformation (DRT) is unequal to
the foreign rate of transformation (FRT), production takes place
at an inefficient point on the inferior PPF, i.e, P, instead of
P2 .
While the choice of criteria for protection can lead to a
shrinking of the PPF, this is not necessarily the case. Thus,
procedures can be designed that maintain production on the PPF.
In the context of our example, this would be the case if
L=L(p 1F(K,N).). In this case the focus of investigators is on
turnover (gross sales). However, the indirect lobbying
distortion remains, in that DRT > FRT.2" Thus, production now
occurs at P3 and welfare (measured in terms of social
indifference curves) improves in comparision to the previous case
(C2>C1) ." But, the indirect lobbying distortion reduces welfare
in comparison to the case where there is no possibility of
attaining protection (C0). The inference is that if indirect
lobbying is possible the domestic marginal rate of transformation
in production will not equal the marginal rate of transformation
through trade. Thus, even if the criteria were such that
production would continue on the efficiency locus, there will be
29 That is, p1/[p 2 (1-L')J]>p 1 /p 2 =r, where p2 is the world price
of good 2 and ir is the world terms of trade (pa/P2) -
"0 The terms-of-trade line (77) is tangent to the inf erior
PPF at P2 only by chance. Presenting things this way avoids
cluttering the figure more than necessary.
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a distortion that reduces welfare.
Three conclusions emerge concerning the design of an
efficient system of emergency protection. First, there need to
be "hard" requirements (rules), in the sense that they must be
met. This is required to minimize the scope for rent-seeking in
general, and for directly unproductive lobbying (DUP) activities
in particular. Rules should not be subject to discretion on the
part of investigating agencies or the political authorities.
Thus, a technical "low level track" procedure" is required that
is not susceptible to direct lobbying. Second, industry-to-
industry arrangements such as VERs should be prohibited, as these
provide an alternative way of reducing import competition without
having to satisfy any preconditions. Third, criteria and
indicators must be such that the scope for indirect lobbying is
minimized. Current contingent protection legislation often
embodies incentives for indirect lobbying. For example,
indicators of injury used by U.S. investigating agencies include
trends in market share, employment, profits, capacity, capacity
utilization, import penetration, and price underselling (i.e.,
exporters supply price being less than that of the import-
competing industry). 32  Capacity, utilization, employment, and
profits often will not be closely linked to trends in imports,
while business cycle influences are likely to be of greater
importance in explaining the evolution of these variables. More
important, while all of these indicators may to some extent be
correlated with "injury," many can be manipulated by firms.
What criteria should be imposed as part of a system of
emergency protection? We believe that import penetration is the
only relevant criterion in that it is the least susceptible to
strategic behavior and is directly tied to the presumed source
of difficulty. Additonally, a national interest criterion should
"1 This terminology has been used by Finger, Hall, and Nelson
(1982).
32 Not all of these indicators need to be satisfied. Under
U.S. law investigating authorities have a substantial degree of
discretion, as the law does not specify which, or how many, of
the indicators need to be satisfied.
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be incorporated, where this is defined in such a way that it
requires a cost-benefit analysis by an independent agency of the
economy-wide effects of imposing protection." The results of
this analysis should be published." While cases may arise where
the national interest is deemed to diverge from the results of
an economic cost-benefit analysis, it is important that the
criteria used in reaching the decision be publicized. 35 In doing
the required cost/benefit analysis, it is important that the
market structure of the industry be taken into account. The
majority of the firms making up the import-competing industry
should be experiencing difficulty. For example, if an industry
is competitive and only a subset of the firms involved are in
difficulty there should be no intervention. If there are only
a few firms in the industry, intervention may simply strengthen
monopolistic tendencies. Contingent protection always has this
danger and it should be recognized. Thus, a competition aspect
should be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis. In those
cases where protection is likely to lead to a noncompetitive
situation it should be rejected.
A number of authors have proposed that an additional
criterion should be that the industry demonstrate a willingness
to adjust to the changing circumstances." One way to do this is
to require that an adjustment plan be drawn up and submitted
prior to protection being awarded. The rationale behind these
types of proposals is that if no adjustment takes place the
pressures for protection will persist. Although the problem is
" This has been suggested by numerous people and
organizations. See, for example, Laird and Sampson (1987) and
the references cited therein.
"As suggested by Finger (1982).
* There are numerous ways in which national interest can be
defined, as is illustrated in the literature on noneconomic
objectives for example. For a discussion in the context of
designing a system of protection, see Laird and Sampson (1987).
* See, for example, Aho and Aronson (1985), Hufbauer and
Rosen (1986), Jackson (1986). These ideas are also reflected in
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.
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usually one of adjustment, proposals along these lines will not
necessarily improve matters. To be credible (enforceable), such
an approach requires the existence of a strong legalistic
structure of the type found in the U.S. These do not exist in
either Western Europe or in developing countries." As noted
above, we believe that emergency protection should focus on
import penetration, not adjustment pers. To the extent that
there are adjustment problems, policies dealing with them should
be generally available and should not be trade policies.
Finally, we can note that political failure is as, if not more,
pervasive than market failure, so that great care must be taken
when advocating government involvement in the specifics of
industry adjustment."
Whatever criteria are chosen, it is important that the
associated incentive effects on exporters as well as import-
competing industries are analyzed carefully. The possibility of
"perverse" incentive effects on exporters can be illustrated by
a brief analysis of AD legislation. In particular, while AD
threats embody incentives for exporters to reduce exports, such
behavior may not necessarily benefit import-competing firms in
the nation threatening AD. To illustrate matters, we can use the
following simple framework. Assume a situation where there is
a firm that produces for both a home and a foreign market. For
simplicity we let this firm be risk neutral. Its problem is to
maximize expected profits, using output allocated to the home and
foreign markets as instruments (x2 and x 2 , respectively):
(2) Max R,(x ) + R2(x 2) - C(x 1 +x 2),
where Ri represents revenue in market i and C represents costs.
The first-order conditions for this problem are, of course, that
marginal revenue in both markets is equated to marginal costs
" We owe this point to Patrick Messerlin.
"See Buchanan (1988) on political f ailure , and Lawrence
(1988) for a discussion of government measures to promote
adjustment in Japan, Canada, and the United States.
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(R1 ' = R2 ' = C' (.)), where primes denote first derivatives. Under
AD legislation an exporter can be confronted with AD if it can
be shown that: (1) prices charged abroad are less than those
charged at home for the same (equivalent) product; and (2) the
domestic industry is being injured." The exporter's problem is
then to maximize the following:
(3) R2(x 1 ) + q(x 1 ,x 2)r 2 (x) + (l-q(.))R(x 2 ) - C(x 1+x2),
where r is the revenue function facing the firm in the
constrained case where it is faced with an AD action, and q is
the probability of an action. Note that r2 is a function of xi,
because in the constrained case the (ex post) level of sales
abroad will be a function of the price charged in the foreign
market, which in turn will be a function of x1 ."° The parameter
q is a function of x, and x2, where Sq/6x 1 < 0, and 6q/6x2 > 0."4
In principle q is also a function of the injury requirement, as
q increases as as the level of injury increases. However, injury
is likely to be highly correlated with total imports into the
country, which are usually exogenous to a firm. First order
conditions are:
(4) R1 '(x,) + q'(-)[r 2 - R2 ] +q(.)r2' = C'(-)
(5) q'(-)[r 2 - R2 ] + (l-mq)R 2' =C'(-)
" Our treatment here is intended to capture only the broad
effects of AD, so that we ignore the finer details. We assume for
convenience that the firm has market power and sells part of its
output in its home market, although this is not necessary for
dumping to occur as defined in AD legislation.
"0 This is probably the simplest way to model the effects of
an AD threat. More realistically, constrained revenue if an
action occurs is a function of both x1 and x2, as these will
determine the difference in prices across markets, i.e., the
dumping margin. While this complicates the analysis, the results
remain the same. See Leidy and Hoekman (1988).
"As x1 increases, its price will tend to decrease, so that
q will decline as the dumping margin will decline. The converse
holds for increases in x2 .
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Notice that the marginal revenue associated with an
increase in domestically allocated output differs from that in
the previous situation. The extra terms reflect the possibility
that the firm may increase expected revenue by selling each
constrained unit abroad at a somewhat lower price than otherwise,
and thus at a price somewhat closer to the unconstrained optimum.
That is, the possibility arises that by adjusting domestic output
the firm can trade-off revenue at home against expected revenue
abroad under an AD action. In particular, if gr,' > q'[.],
firms have an incentive to exceed the unconstrained optimum at
home for any level of total production. By following this
procedure, damages associated with an ex post AD action are
reduced, as is the likelihood of being found to be dumping.
While this is only a possibility in the context of the discrete
probability model used here, it is not unlikely to occur. Thus,
Leidy and Hoekman (1988), using a continuous model where dumping
in part is a function of the realization of a random variable
(the exchange rate) with known subjective probability
distribution, found that this was always the case for price-based
AD laws . 42
Expected marginal revenue abroad under AD threat declines
for any level of x2. This occurs because the marginal value of
x 2 is zero once the AD constraint becomes binding (i.e., ex ante
changes in x 2 no longer can influence revenue). This implies
that for any level of x2 the expected marginal revenue generated
abroad is less than in the unconstrained case. Thus, firms will
shift away from the foreign market on the margin, and the threat
of AD acts to reduce import competition. However, the threat is
42 AD actions may also be based on "constructed value" if
firms are alleged to be selling below costs of production or
there are no sufficient home market sales. In this case the home
market effect is not available to firms because long run average
total costs are the criterion. These cannot be altered in the
short run, in contrast to the dumping margin if a price-based
investigation is followed. Cost-based actions are usually taken
only if home market sales are very small or negligible or exports
originate in a nonmarket economy. Presumably firms will know
with a high degree of certainty which type of action they will
face.
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only partially effective, as firms may increase home market sales
also. The point to be made is that such a lack of neutrality is
not desirable in a system dealing with market disruption because
it induces the kinds of distortions just analyzed. The
implication is again that great care should be taken when
deciding on the criteria to impose in a system of emergency
protection. Given our advocacy of tradable quotas as the remedy
in safeguards cases, the next section focuses on possible
incentive effects that arise if such a procedure is implemented.
IV. Effects of Quota Threats on Exporters
As noted above, . the existence of the prospect of
protection may cause potentially affected exporting firms to
(re)act ante. Usually this will not be desirable. The effect
of threats implied by quotas can be illustrated using an
equivalent framework as above. If there exists a possibility
of being confronted with contingent protection, the firm's
problem is altered as follows:
__ (6) R,(x 1 ) + q(x 2)r 2 (a 2 (x 2)) + [l-'q(x 2 )]R 2(x 2) - C(s)
_-where F2(-) is again the revenue the firm obtains in the
constrained case where it is faced with protection, a2 is the
constrained quantity exported, and q is the probability of such
action occuring. If protection is imposed, a2 is a function of
the prior quantity shipped (x 2). This is the case presently
under both VER negotiation procedures and emergency protection
rules that conform to Article XIX. of the GATT. One of the
distinguishing characteristics of alternative measures of
contingent protection is the way in which q is determined . For
the present, we assume that q is a function of x2, which would be
the case if the instrument used was a VER or a quota. Thus,
0<q<1 and q'(-) > 0. The first order conditions associated with
this problem are as follows:
(7) R 1 '(-) =C'-
(8) q(-)r 2 1 a2 ' + q'(-)[T2(*)-R 2(.) ) + (1-q)R2 ' = C'(*)
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If a, is exogenous (i.e. , a2'=0) in the sense that the firm cannot
influence its level, q(.)r 2' = 0, because r 2 ' = 0. If this is the
case, it is easy to see that the firm will be induced to cut back
deliveries to the foreign market. Given that r 2 < R2, equation
(6) implies that realizations of x2 on average will be less than
in the unconstrained case. If the constraint is binding,
marginal revenue of x2 is zero, and optimality therefore requires
a reduction in x,.
More realistically, a2' > 0. The effect of the threat of
protection becomes ambiguous, and in principle it is possible
that the threat induces the firm to send more output to the
foreign market. This is because the constrained level of exports
under protection is positively related to the prior level of
exports, so that the firm has an incentive to exceed the pre-
threat level of optimal exports so as to be in a better position
if the threat materializes.
Such a possibility is easily demonstrated using the simple
analytical framework presented above. Taking a step towards
further realism, assume that there is not one firm, but a large
number of them (i = 1, ... , n) all of which export the good (or
a close substitute) to the foreign market. Let q = g(x, ... ,
x.) denote the probability that emergency protection will be
imposed, and let xi be the quantity shipped to the foreign market
by the i" exporting firm. Thus, q is now a function of total
exports to the foreign market. If the protectionist action
materializes, each firm is limited in the amount it can export
in comparison to the no-intervention case. Let this amount be
ai(xi), where a'(-)>0. That is, each firm's constrained exports
are again an increasing function of the prior quantity shipped
to the foreign market. The problem facing each firm is then to
maximize the following objective function:
(9) R1 (y) + q(x1 , . .. , x.)T' 1(ar(-.) ) +4 (l-q( .) )R1 (x±) - C(-)
where y is the amount the firm sells at home. First order
conditions become:
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(10) R1 (y) = C'(.)
(11) qri ' (ai) a 1' (.) + 6q/6xi(ri (.) -Ri(-)) + (l-q)R1'(x) = C' (. )
Again, the equilibrium conditions for the home market remain the
same, although it must be remembered that costs are likely to
change due to changes in total output. But, the effect on output
allocated to the foreign market is now qualitatively different
from that discussed in previous cases. If the number of firms
is large, individual market shares will be small. As the
probability of a contingent action is now a function of total
exports to the foreign markets, independent variations in
quantity shipped abroad may be perceived to have a negligible
effect on the probability of an action. Thus, as the number of
firms increases, 6q(-)/6xi -+ 0. In this case, the probability of
an action is endogenous to the industry, but exogenous to the
individual firm. Equation (11) then becomes
(12) q(. )ri' (-)ai' (-) + (1-q(-))Ri'(xi) = C'(-)
To establish a benchmark, suppose ai' = 1. .The first order
condition for the foreign market then becomes
(13) q(-)ri'( a) - (1-q(-))R/'(xi) = C'(-)
This expression, in conjunction with the objective function (9)
shows that at any level of output there is a tendency for the
firm to ship more to the foreign market under the threat than in
its absence. In fact, the absolute quantity shipped abroad after
the threat is established exceeds that in the case where it is
absent if cz1' = 1. In general, there will exist a threshold
value for cz±' that is less than one which will induce the firm to
ship more abroad under a threat situation.
The firm thus faces a tradeoff : by overshooting the pre-
threat optimum level of exports it enhances its position ex ante.
This is because if the threat is realized its action will. have
increased the quantity it can sell. However, its position will
23
deteriorate should the threat not materialize. This problem of
"perverse" threat effects is a function of the link between the
constrained and unconstrained level of sales." As indicated
above, such linkages are common, and most proposals we are aware
of in the area of emergency protection continue to incorporate
them. In the rest of the paper we will refer to this issue as
the coupln.gms problem. The implication is that any efficient
system of emergency protection must be "decoupled.""
In the preceeding subsection we advocated the use of
tradable quotas in the context of emergency protection. Thus
there is a need to deal with the coupling problem identified
above. One possibility would be to exempt those suppliers whose
exports grew at less than x% per year. However, this
discriminates against those that are most efficient (have
comparative advantage) and sets up an incentive for trade
diversion. A better procedure is to base the level of the global
quota on the level of imports during a base year prior to market
disruption, and increase this base level by the rate of growth
(or some proportion of it) of world trade in that product.
Country shares in the global quota can then be allocated on the
basis of country shares in world trade in that product.
V. Concluding Remarks
As is well-known, trade policy is usually inefficient in
that it tends to create more distortions than it solves. Indeed,
43 That there might be an incentive to increase exports when
facing the threat of a VER has been noted in the literature
(Bergsten, 1975; Jones, 1984; Stockhausen, 1988). This is
intuitive because a VER must be negotiated. It is not imposed,
so that exporters have an incentive to "up the ante. " Our point
is a more general one.
" The same type of result may emerge if foreign firms have
market power. In this case they might (implicitly) target
industry market structure in the importing nation. It is well
known that import protection may have the effect of cartelizing
(or even monopolizing) the market. Thus, if ex post rents are
high enough, it is possible that imposition of protection is
sought by the exporters . In that case it could be in their
interest to expand exports, thus inducing the protection, which
then allows them to capture the associated rents.
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Deardorff and Stern (1987) have likened trade policy to doing
accupuncture with a two-pronged fork; even if one of the prongs
finds the right spot, the other prong can only do harm. This
applies to protection in response to market disruption as well,
of course. Protection is also a very costly form of
intervention, both in a static sense (as demonstrated by numerous
studies of "costs per job saved," for example), and in a dynamic
sense (due to the distortions that reduce economic growth). In
practical terms, however, given a socio-political need to address
"market disturbance," temporary contingent protection may be the
best response in situations where import penetration has
increased substantially. The issue then is to design and
implement procedures that are effective, equitable, and minimize
distortions.
There is close to a consensus among economists that ideally
measures to deal with market disruption should be along the lines
of GATT's Article XIX: nondiscriminatory, transparent, and
temporary. But, as we have shown, this is not enough. In
addition, the scope for strategic behavior on the part of both
import-competing firms and exporters needs to be minimized. In
general, existing procedures can be expected to lead to an
undesirable reallocation of real (productive) resources ex ante,
as well as ex ps. The incentives for rent-seeking behavior -
which includes both familiar direct lobbying and what we have
called "indirect" lobbying (via strategic changes in the firm's
production decision) - are insufficiently recognized by
policymakers. The same pertains to the effect on exporters of
the threat embodied in the existence of measures of contingent
protection.
In this paper we have been interested more in designing a
system to deal with market disruption de novoQ than in improving
the status quo. A system of nondiscriminatory emergency
protection along the lines sketched out above (that is, embodying
compensation of exporters through the use of global tradable
quotas, and subject to criteria that minimize the scope for
direct and indirect lobbying) should be feasible to implement for
nations "starting fresh." While inferior to a tariff-based
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system in terms of efficiency, we believe this is not too
important as long as protection is temporary and is found to be
in the national interest, and is outweighed by the implicit
compensation of affected exporting firms.
Many of the necessary conditions for efficient intervention
are embodied in Article XIX of the GATT, and from an economic
perspective there is nothing wrong with the principles that
underlie this Article. As noted above, the practical problem in
many~ industrialized countries is the existence of more accessible
but inferior alternative instruments such as AD actions and VERs.
One could argue that given the fact that there currently are
multiple ways in which protection can be obtained in many
countries, it may serve little purpose to discuss the design of
a more efficient and equitable system of emergency protection.
This is too negative a view, however, as it should be possible
for industrialized nations to improve on the status quo.
Nevertheless, realism forces one to doubt that fundamental
changes will occur in these countries that will make recourse to
these discriminatory instruments of protection less attractive
to import-competing firms. While one could advocate the repeal
of AD laws, this is very unlikely to occur. 5  Feasible
improvements would be to ban VERs (that is, make them illegal)
on antitrust grounds, for example, set minimum levels of dumping
and subsidization, and impose costs on firms that use AD/CVD to
harass their competition."
"~ Caine (1981) has advocated the repeal of AD laws.
" See , f or example , Bhagwati (1988 ) and UNCTAD (198 4) .
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